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Abstract. There are numerous methods of achieving -differential pri-
vacy (DP). The question is what is the appropriate value of , since there
is no common agreement on a “sufficiently small” , and its goodness de-
pends on the query as well as the data. In this paper, we show how to
compute  that corresponds to δ, defined as the adversary’s advantage
in probability of guessing some specific property of the output. The at-
tacker’s goal can be stated as Boolean expression over guessing particular
attributes, possibly within some precision. The attributes combined in
this way should be independent. We assume that both the input and the
output distributions have corresponding probability density functions, or
probability mass functions.
1 Introduction
Computing queries on statistical databases inevitably leaks something about
the underlying data, even if only an aggregated output is observed. Differential
privacy [3] (DP) quantifies privacy losses coming from such queries, and estimates
accumulation of the losses if several queries are made to the same data. Roughly
speaking, DP says that, if two databases are sufficiently similar, then the attacker
should not be able (up to certain extent, parametrized by  ≥ 0) to distinguish
between them by observing the query output. If the outputs are numeric, DP
is commonly achieved by adding calibrated noise to them. The smaller  is, the
larger is the noise magnitude, and the higher is privacy.
While cryptographic security parameters are in general well-understandable,
it is not so easy with DP. In general, there is no upper bound on , and we cannot
tell in advance how small  is “good enough”. Suppose that we have come up
with some fixed 0 to conceal the change in a numeric attribute of an input table
(let us denote it x) by 1. The number 1 is a very abstract value, and we need
to know what it means in reality. For example, if x is population size, then 1
is a very small change that may be not worth of hiding, and if x ∈ [0, 1] is a
? This research was funded by the Air Force Research laboratory (AFRL) and Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) under contract FA8750-16-C-0011.
The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
ar
X
iv
:1
91
1.
12
77
7v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
8 N
ov
 20
19
probability, then 1 would cover the entire space of inputs x. In the first case, we
may want to enhance the privacy and require that e.g. change ∆ = 1000 should
be untrackable. With respect to the new metric, we get exactly the same level
of differential privacy for  = 0 · 1000 = 0.001 · 0. We see that we cannot define
in advance “sufficiently good” .
Intuitively, in the last example we have linked goodness of  to the underlying
metric, so we should consider  together with the metric to define its goodness.
We want to convert these two quantities to a single estimate that would be more
standard and easier to interpret. In this paper, we show how to relate the metric
and the  to attacker’s advantage in guessing a particular attribute.
2 Related Work
Differential privacy was first introduced by Dwork [3]. Numerous follow-up pa-
pers show how to achieve it for certain types of queries and database met-
ric [1,5,2,8,7,4]. PINQ [13] is probably the most famous example of a worked-out
framework that provides privacy-preserving replies to database queries.
This work is mainly motivated by [11], which is one of the few papers mention-
ing the way of choosing appropriate , relating it to the difference in attacker’s
prior (before observing the output) and posterior (after observing the output)
knowledge about the input data. Since  of DP may be difficult to interpret,
there also exist alternative definitions of DP like Pufferfish privacy [9] or Differ-
ential identifiability [12]. In this paper, similarly to [11], we are staying within
standard definition of DP and do not consider alternative definitions.
The results of [11] have been briefly mentioned in [10], being generalized from
Laplace noise to arbitrary DP mechanisms, showing its potential usefulness to
non-standard database metric. In this paper, we formalize these initial results,
extend them, and provide technical details of applying it in practice. In general,
we can use a system that supports non-standard metrics (like [10]) to estimate
the amount of noise. For some particular cases like filtering by a discrete at-
tribute, we get standard metric, so we can utilize obtained  e.g. directly in
PINQ system.
3 Guessing Advantage and Differential Privacy
3.1 Definition of Guessing Advantage
We start from the attacker model of [11], where the attacker advantage is defined
as the difference between its prior and posterior beliefs on the property that he is
guessing. While [11] is based on Laplace noise distribution, the analysis developed
in [10] is based on generalized Cauchy distribution, for which it is more difficult
to compute precise bounds. In this paper we work with more general bounds,
which can be derived directly from the definition of differential privacy, without
relying on the specific privacy mechanism.
First, let us give some definitions that we will use in this chapter.
Definition 1 (Differential privacy). Let X be a metric space. Given  ≥
0, a mechanism Mq is -differentially private if, for any x, x′ ∈ X such that
d(x, x′) ≤ d, and for any subset Y ⊆Mq(X) of outputs, we have
Pr[Mq(x) ∈ Y ] ≤ ed ·Pr[Mq(x′) ∈ Y ] .
Definition 2 (Differential privacy w.r.t. component). Let X = (X1, . . . , Xn)
be a metric space. Given  ≥ 0, a mechanismMq is -differentially private w.r.t.
the component Xj if, for any x, x
′ ∈ X such that d(xj , x′j) ≤ d, xi = x′i for all
i 6= j, and for any subset Y ⊆Mq(X) of outputs, we have
Pr[Mq(x) ∈ Y ] ≤ ed ·Pr[Mq(x′) ∈ Y ] .
While Def. 1 is a general definition of differential privacy, Def. 2 is its par-
ticular instantiation on multidimensional data.
We are now ready to define the guessing advantage. Let x ∈ X be the input.
The attacker has a goal g : S → {0, 1}∗, which defines the information that
he wants to learn about x. There is a function e : S → {0, 1}∗ defining the
information that the attacker already knows about x. We want to know how the
distribution of g(X) changes after the attacker in addition gets the output q(x)
of a (differentially private) query q : S → Y .
The security definition is related to the difference between posterior (with
observation q(x)) and prior (without observation q(x)) probabilities of guessing
g(X) = g(x), assuming that the extra information e(x) is included as a condition
of both prior and posterior probabilities.
Definition 3. [Guessing advantage (discrete)] Let x ∈ X be the data instance,
Mq the observation, g the attacker goal, and e the extra information. We say
that advantage of guessing g(x) is at most δ if, for any algorithm A,
|Pr[A(Mq(x), e(x)) = g(x) | Y ]−Pr[A(e(x)) = g(x) | Y ]| ≤ δ
where Y = (Mq(X) =Mq(x)) ∧ (e(X) = e(x)).
For continuous data, the probability mass of each single point may be 0. It is
possible that Pr[g(X) = g(x)] = 0 for all x, so Def. 3 does not make any sense.
Indeed, in practice it can be equally bad if the attacker learns some geographical
location ”precisely” or ”close enough”, so we need to introduce the notion of
precision. The attacker wants to come up with a point x′ such that d(x, x′) ≤ r
for a sufficiently small r.
Definition 4. [Guessing advantage (continuous)] Let x ∈ X be the data in-
stance, Mq the observation, g the attacker goal, and e the extra information.
Let B(x, r) = {x′|d(x, x′) ≤ r}. We say that advantage of guessing g(x) with
precision r is at most δ if, for any algorithm A,
|Pr[A(Mq(x), e(x)) ∈ B(g(x), r) | Y ]−Pr[A(e(x)) ∈ B(g(x), r) | Y ]| ≤ δ
where Y = (Mq(X) =Mq(x)) ∧ (e(X) = e(x)).
While the algorithm A can in principle be arbitrary, we consider an attacker
who knows the distribution of inputs, i.e. attacker’s prior belief is equivalent to
the actual distribution of inputs. If he only gets the extra knowledge e(x), he
estimates the probability weight of ”sufficiently correct answers” B(g(x), r) as
Prpre[B(g(x), r)] := Pr[X ∈ B(g(x), r) | e(X) = e(x)], i.e. the prior probability.
If he gets in addition the output Mq(x), the confidence is Prpost[B(g(x), r)] :=
Prpre[B(g(x), r) | Mq(X) =Mq(x), e(X) = e(x)], i.e. the posterior probability.
3.2 From Guessing Advantage to Epsilon
Let the posterior belief of the adversary be expressed by the probability dis-
tribution Prpost[·]. Let the initial distribution of X be Prpre[·], and fX the
corresponding probability density function (PDF), i.e. Prpre[X
′] =
∫
X′ fX(x)dx
for X ′ ⊆ X. Let fY be the PDF of the outputs of fY . Note that existence of
fX and fY is required for the further analysis. We want to compute an upper
bound on Prpost[X
′] for some X ′ ⊆ X.
We have Prpost[X
′] := Pr[x ∈ X ′ | Mq(x) = y], where y is the output that
the attacker observed. Let
∫
A
denote a Lebesgue integral over a subset A of some
metric space. Similarly to [11] and [10], we rewrite the posterior probability as
Prpost[X
′] =
∫
X′
fX(x
′ | Mq(x′) = y) dx′
=
∫
X′
fY (y |x′)fX(x′)
fY (y)
dx′ =
∫
X′ fY (y |x′)fX(x′) dx′∫
X
fY (y |x) fX(x) dx
=
∫
X′ fY (y |x′)fX(x′) dx′∫
X′ fY (y |x) fX(x) dx+
∫
X\X′ fY (y |x) fX(x) dx
=
1
1 +
∫
X\X′ fY (y|x)fX(x)dx∫
X′ fY (y|x′)fX(x′)dx′
.
Let us assume that R := supx∈X d(x, x
′) exists. Differential privacy gives us
Pr[Mq(x′)∈Y ]
Pr[Mq(x)∈Y ] ≤ e·R for all Y , and hence also
fY (y|x′)
fY (y|x) ≤ e·R. We get
Prpost[X
′] ≤ 1
1 + e−R · Prpre[X\X′]Prpre[X′]
.
Hence, if we want Prpost[X
′] ≤ Prpre[X ′] + δ, we need to take
 ≤ lb :=
− ln
(
Prpre[X
′]
Prpre[X\X′] · ( 1δ+Prpre[X′] − 1)
)
R
.
So far, we have shown that Prpost[X
′] ≤ Prpre[X ′] + δ. To satisfy Def. 5, we
also need Prpost[X
′] ≥ Prpre[X ′] − δ, or Prpost[X \X ′]) ≤ Prpre[X \X ′] + δ,
to show that the distribution has not changed much in overall compared to
prior. The derivation of  for the lower bound is analogous to the upper bound.
Substituting Prpre[X
′] with Prpre[X \X ′], we get a bound
 ≤ ub :=
− ln
(
Prpre[X\X′]
Prpre[X′]
· ( 1δ+Prpre[X\X′] − 1)
)
R
.
To satisfy |Prpost[X ′]−Prpre[X ′]| ≤ δ, we eventually need to take
 = min(lb, ub) .
Note that, if p ≤ 1−p, then lb ≤ ub, and if 1−p ≤ p, then ub ≤ lb. Hence,
we do not need to compute both bounds.
Constraining the search space The problem of this approach is that R can be
very large in practice, or even not exist. Note that we are essentially trying
to prove that the elements of X ′ are “sufficiently indistinguishable” from the
elements of X \ X ′. In practice, it may be sufficient to take just a subset of
Xˆ ′ ⊆ X \X ′ and show that it is difficult to distinguish X ′ and Xˆ ′. We have
Prpost[X
′] =
1
1 +
∫
X\X′ fY (y|x)fX(x)dx∫
X′ fY (y|x′)fX(x′)dx′
≤ 1
1 +
∫
Xˆ′ fY (y|x)fX(x)dx∫
X′ fY (y|x′)fX(x′)dx′
for any Xˆ ′ ⊆ X \X ′. Let Xˆ ′a := {x | d(x, x′) ≤ a} \X ′ for some a ∈ R. We get
 ≤
− ln
(
Prpre[X
′]
Prpre[Xˆ′a]
· ( 1δ+Prpre[X′] − 1)
)
a
. (1)
If R := supx∈X,x′∈X′ d(x, x
′) does not exist, then we may instead take a such
that Pr[x | ∀x′ ∈ X ′ : d(x, x′) ≤ a] ≈ 1, which is useful e.g. when the input
comes from normal distribution. It is possible that there are better candidates
for a. A method to choose optimal a for a uniformly distributed attribute is
given in App. A, but we do not have a generic approach for this. In practice,
if there is R such that Pr[x | ∀x′ ∈ X ′ : d(x, x′) ≤ R] ≈ 1, since computing 
from a is a cheap operation, we may sample several different values of a from the
interval (0, R], and take one for which  is the largest, i.e. noise is the smallest.
4 Instantiation to databases
As in [10], we assume that a database is an element of a Banach space X =
(X1, . . . , Xn). In general, n is the total number of variables defining the database.
While it seems the most intuitive to think that each Xi corresponds to some cell
of a table in the database, it is possible that Xi in turn denotes a subspace of
variables, i.e. a row or a column.
Let q : X → Y be a query. Let the noised queryMq be differentially private
variant of q. Let X = (X1, . . . , Xn), and let Xi be the component that the
attacker wants to guess (e.g. a subset of table columns). Let us constrain Def. 4
and take g(x) = xk and e(x) = (x1, . . . , xk−1, xk+1, . . . , xn). Defining guessing
advantage w.r.t. component, will be related to Def 2 of DP w.r.t. component.
Definition 5. [Guessing advantage w.r.t. component] Let x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈
(X1, . . . , Xn) be the data instance, Mq(x) the observation. We say that advan-
tage of guessing xk with precision rk is at most δ if∣∣∣∣∣∣Pr[B(xk, rk) | Mq(X) =Mq(x),
∧
i6=k
(Xi = xi)]−Pr[B(xk, rk) |
∧
i6=k
(Xi = xi)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ ,
where B(xk, rk) = {x′k|d(xk, x′k) ≤ r}.
Formally, there is a collection S = {Sk | k ∈ [|S|]} of sets of sensitive at-
tributes that the attacker wants to guess. Each Sk ∈ S is of the form Sk =
{(xk1 , rk1), . . . , (xknk , rknk )}, denoting the set of variables xi that are not al-
lowed to be disclosed to the attacker with precision at least ri. All the attributes
of Sk define one disclosure, i.e., the attacker needs to guess all xi in order to
win.
4.1 The Univariate Case
First, we show how to compute the  for a single set Sk ∈ S, where Sk =
{(t, r)} is univariate. The set of “sufficiently correct guesses” is defined as X ′ =
{x′ | d(t, x′) ≤ r}. Let R be such that Pr[x | ∀x′ ∈ X ′ : d(x, x′) ≤ R] ≈ 1.
As discussed in Sec. 3.2, to achieve Prpost[X
′] ≤ Prpre[X ′] + δ, we can
come up with a ≤ R defining Xˆ ′a := {x | ∀x′ ∈ X ′ : d(x, x′) ≤ a} \ X ′. We
get Xˆ ′a := {x | r < d(x, x′) ≤ a}. It is more complicated with defining a for
Prpost[X
′] ≥ Prpre[X ′]−δ, as the elements inside X \X ′ can already be R units
apart from each other.
It can be reasonable to adjust Def. 5 and deliberately reduce the search space
of the attacker, taking X := X ′ ∪ Xˆa. Formally, we increase the knowledge of
the attacker and add to e(x) the information that the input is located inside
Xˆa. Note that we do not rescale the prior Prpre[X
′], but just “squeeze” the
remaining probability weight so that Prpre[Xˆa] := Prpre[X \X ′]. As the result,
we now only claim that the prior and the posterior distributions are different for
x such that d(x, t) ≤ a. This allows to consider distances up to a. The smaller a
is, the closer is Prpost[X
′] to 1.
It remains to show how the values Prpre[X
′] and Prpre[Xˆa] are actually
computed. Let g be a function such that g(z) := Prpre[x | d(x, t) ≤ z]. The
input t is implicitly included into description of g. We have Prpre[X
′] = g(r)
and Prpre[Xˆ ′a] = g(a) − g(r). Let us investigate some special cases of g(z). We
also see whether we are able to make any reasonable analysis if prior probabilities
are not known in advance, and we look more precisely at discrete datasets.
Uniform distribution. Given a radius r and an upper bound R on d(x, x′), it is
easy to compute Prpre[X
′] = 2rR . For a < R, we can as well take g(a) =
2a
R .
This is true of we can perfectly fit Xˆ ′a into X. The problem is that the input t
may be located not in the “center” of the space X, but somewhere in the corner,
as shown in Figure 1. It may happen that we cannot come up with a set Xˆ ′a
with probability weight 2(a−r)R that would satisfy d(x, x
′) ≤ a for all x ∈ Xˆ ′a
and x′ ∈ X ′, and need to include more distant points into Xˆ ′a. We may have
distance up to d(x, x′) ≤ 2a for x′ ∈ X ′, x ∈ Xˆ ′a, which means that 2 will go to
the exponent of e. To avoid the change in exponent, we can just take a′ := 2a,
getting Prpre[X
′] = 2rR and g(a
′) = a
′
R .
a
X ′X
Fig. 1: Bad location of X ′
Distributions with well-defined cumulative distribu-
tion function (CDF). We can estimate noise for
normally distributed inputs, and in general for data
with well-defined CDF F (x). Namely, since we de-
fine g(z) = {x|d(x, t) ≤ z}, then by definition of
CDF we get X ′ = F (x+ z)− F (x− z).
If we are not given an upper bound R on X,
then we can still derive some R based on the dis-
tribution. If the distribution has bell shape, it does
not make sense to consider elements that are too
far from the center. For example, for normal distri-
bution N(µ, σ2) we can take R = µ+ 3 · √2σ, which covers erf (3) ≈ 0.9999779
of the input space and is more than enough.
The worst prior probability. Even if the input distribution is unknown, we can
still define Prpre[X
′] in such a way that the maximum noise will be needed, so
that our analysis would be valid for any possible prior. This value is non-trivial,
e.g. although p = 1.0 increases posterior probability the most, the advantage
would be 0. We want to find p that maximizes
 =: f(p) =
− ln
(
p
1−p · ( 1δ+p − 1)
)
R
.
We can do it by using common calculus. We have
df
dp
(p) =
(
1
(p+ δ)− (p+ δ)2 −
1
(1− p)− (1− p)2
)
· 1
R
,
and we have dfdp (p) = 0 for p =
1−δ
2 .
Is it reasonable to try out a < R if the input distribution is unknown?
In general, if we have no additional knowledge, we only know that g(R) = 1.
Alternatively, if we do know that g(a) = q for some q, then we can take q − p
instead of 1 − p. For example, even if we do not know details of the input
distribution, if it is known that most of the data stays within some R′ < R, and
Prpre[x | d(t, x) ≤ R′] = q, it can be useful to give take a := R′.
The question is how to choose the worst-case p. Substituting 1 − p with
g(a)− p, we get
df
dp
(p) =
(
1
(p+ δ)− (p+ δ)2 −
1
(q − p)− (q − p)2
)
· 1
R
,
and we have dfdp (p) = 0 for p =
δ(1−δ)+q(1−q)
2(δ+q−1) . This is in general different from
the q = 1 case. However, note that in practice it is fine to consider only the case
q = 1. If we have found p that minimizes  in the case a = R, this  is in any
case sufficient. The aim of taking a < R is only to check whether it is possible
to come up with a better . Hence, we can always take p = 1−δ2 .
A discrete set of prior probabilities. Suppose that the possible value of x may
come from the set of values {x1, . . . , xn} with probabilities {p1, . . . , pn} respec-
tively (
∑n
i=1 pi = 1). Here x is not necessarily a single attribute, and the set
{p1, . . . , pn} may be computed from all possible combinations of several at-
tributes, which in this case are allowed to be correlated.
If we have access to the actual data, then we may just look at the actual t
and take p = pk such that t = xk, which guarantees that the analysis will be
linear w.r.t, the number of table rows. Without having access to the actual data
(which may happen if global sensitivity is used to enforce DP), we would need
to make a theoretical estimate. We need to take the worst pk to ensure that
each row is protected. If n ≤ ∞, we can do it for each pk one by one, but it
is not computationally reasonable. Instead, we may start directly from pk that
leaks the most. In the previous paragraph we have shown that the worst case
is p′ = 1
1+e−/2 . This value itself may be missing from {p1, . . . , pn}. However,
since the function f(p) has exactly one local maximum at p′ and is monotone
at (−∞, p′] and [p′,∞), the values pl and pr that are closest to p′ from left and
right respectively are the worst cases. It suffices to compute  only for these two
values, and take the smallest one.
4.2 The Multivariate Case: AND-events
Let us compute the  for a single set Sk ∈ S, where Sk = {(t1, r1), . . . , (tn, rn)}.
Assume that there is an upper bound Ri on each dimension. The univariate
case can be generalized to multivariate, treating X = (X1, . . . , Xn) as a single
vector variable, taking t = (t1, . . . , tn), r = (r1, . . . , rn), R = (R1, . . . , Rn). For
this, we need to clarify how the distance in X should be defined. If it is an `p
norm of underlying dimensions, we will have d(t, x) = ||t1 − x1, . . . , tn − xn||p.
According to our intuition, the attacker wins if he guesses correctly a point from
the rectangle [t1− r1, t1 + r1]× · · · × [tn− rn, tn + rn]. Hence, in general we take
p =∞. In some cases, we may as well be interested in other value of p, e.g. if t1
and t2 are coordinates of geographic location, then p = 2 corresponds more to
our intuition.
In Sec. 3.2, the numbers r and a are single numbers, and not vectors. In
general, we should take R = ||R||p, r = ||r||p and a = ||a||p. However, it is not
clear how to come up with a in the first place. First of all, let us scale all
dimensions to get r := ri = rj for all i, j, which allows us to define a single
r. E.g. take r = 1 and scale all Ri accordingly. We can now optimize a based
on this r. Still, as the scaled Ri can be different, the same value a might not
fit into every dimension. Optimizing a multivariate function by trying out all
ai ∈ {r + kN · (Ri − r) | k ∈ {1, . . . , N}} is too expensive. Hence, we first sample
r < a ≤ R, which we will use for distance. We will need particular ai to compute
the probability weights g(ai), and we take ai = min(a,Ri).
In Sec. 4.1, we have shown how to compute g(zi) for one-dimensional zi.
Assuming that the variables are independent, we can compute g(z) =
∏
i g(zi)
for an AND-event. If the variables are not independent, then there will be some
special way of defining g(z), which depends on the distribution. The relations
between variables can make only certain combinations of (a1, . . . , an) possible.
However, since ai are only used in g(ai) anyway, it suffices to work with a
only. Thus, a subspace of correlated variables would be no different from the
univariate case, and the probability distribution over that subspace should be
given in advance.
The discussion above can be summarized into Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. Let X = (X1, . . . , Xn), where Xi are pairwise independent, and
Ri = maxxi,x′i∈Xi d(xi, x
′
i). Let (t1, . . . , tn) be the actual data, and let X
′ =
{x ∈ X | d(ti, xi) ≤ ri}. Let gi(z) := Prpre[xi | d(xi, ti) ≤ z]. Let Mq be an -
DP mechanism w.r.t. norm ||x1, . . . , xn||∞. To bound the guessing advantage of
X ′ by δ, we need to take
 ≤
− ln
( ∏n
i=1 gi(ri)∏n
i=1 gi(ai)−
∏n
i=1 gi(ri)
· ( 1δ+∏ni=1 gi(ri) − 1)
)
a
.
where ai is a freely chosen value satisfying ri < ai ≤ Ri, and a = ||a1, . . . , an||∞.
4.3 The Multivariate Case: OR-events
There are two ways to define guessing advantage for entire S = {Sk | k ∈ [|S|]}:
1. Each Sk ∈ S is protected independently. E.g. if we have two uniformly
distributed binary variables, then advantage δ = 10% means that the prob-
ability of guessing increases from 50% to 60% for any of these variables. For
each Sk ∈ S, we need to satisfy Def. 5 with Xk = {x |
∧
j xij ≤ rij}. The
suitable  for differential privacy noise can be found as described in Sec. 4.1
(for univariate case) and Sec. 4.2 (for multivariate case). We take the maxi-
mum of obtained noise magnitudes, which is sufficient to protect each subset
of sensitive attributes of S.
2. Alternatively, we can estimate the probability that the attacker guesses at
least one set of sensitive attributes. This poses a different question for an
OR condition, and the prior probability gets completely different meaning.
E.g. if we have two uniformly distributed binary variables, we will have
75% of correct and 25% of incorrect guesses, and δ = 10% means that the
probability of guessing at least one of these two increases from 75% to 85%.
This approach assumes Xj = {x|
∨
k
∧
j xij ≤ rij} in Def. 5.
Variant (1) is based purely on results of Sec. 4.1 and Sec. 4.2. In this section,
we show how to deal with variant (2).
It is easier to estimate approximation of an AND of conditions, since the set
X ′ is bounded by ri at the coordinate X ′i, and d(x, x
′) ≤ r = ||r1, . . . , rn||p for
all x, x′ ∈ X. However, if the attacker wants to guess an OR of conditions, then
he may guess xi correctly even if some other variable xj is as far from the actual
value tj as possible, and we may only claim that d(x, x
′) ≤ R = ||R1, . . . , Rn||∞.
A comparison of AND and OR sets is depicted in Figure 2a.
If we take ai = Ri for all i, then the only difference of an OR-event from an
AND-event is the construction of Prpre[X
′]. We have Prpre[X ′] =
∏n
i=1 g(ai)−∏n
i=1 g(ai − ri).
Let us see what happens if we want to use ai < Ri. Now the problem is that
we may have d(x,x′) > a for x,x′ ∈ X ′, as the distances inside X ′ are not
bounded by r. We need to approach it differently.
Let gt′(z) = Pr[{x | d(x1, t′1) ≤ z ∨ · · · ∨ d(xn, t′n) ≤ z}] for t′ ∈ X. Let t =
(t1, . . . , tn) be the actual datapoint.
We split both X ′ and Xˆ ′ into the same number of blocks. The idea is that
each block X ′k of X
′ would have a sufficiently close unique neighbour block Xˆ ′k
in Xˆ ′. Let a = (a1, . . . , an), and a = 2 ||a1, . . . , an||∞. First, we define
X ′0 := {x|
n∧
i=1
xi ∈ B(ti, ai) ∧
(
n∨
i=1
xi ∈ B(ti, ri)
)
}
and
Xˆ ′0 := {x|
n∧
i=1
xi ∈ B(ti, ai)} \X ′0 .
We also define
X`k = {x|xk ∈ B(ti, ri) ∧
n∧
i=1
xi ∈ B(ti + 2`i · ai, ai)}
and
Xˆ`k = {x|
n∧
i=1
xi ∈ B(ti + 2`i · ai, ai)} \ Xˆ ′0
for ` ∈ L ⊆ Zn and k ∈ [n], where L depends on the size of the total space X.
All blocks are pairwise disjoint, and X ′0∪
⋃
`,kX
′`
k = X
′. An example of splitting
into blocks is given in Figure 2b.
The constructed pairs enjoy the following important properties:
1. For all x′ ∈ X ′0, x ∈ Xˆ ′0 (and also x′ ∈ X`k, x ∈ Xˆ`k), we have d(x,x′) ≤ a;
2. We have
Prpost[X
′
0]
Prpost[Xˆ′0]
= gt(a1,...,an)−gt((a1−1,...,an−1)))gt((a1−1,...,an−1)) =: α0;
3. For all k ∈ [n], ` ∈ L, we have Prpost[X`k]
Prpost[Xˆ`k]
=
gt′ (a1,...,rk,...,an)
gt′ (a1,...,ak,...,an)−gt′ (a1,...,rk,...,an) ,
where t′ = (t1+2`1 ·a1, . . . , tk, . . . , tn+2`n ·an). Assuming that the variables
are independent, this equals
gtk (rk)
gtk (ak)−gtk (rk)
=: αk.
xi − ti ≤ ri
xj − tj ≤ rj
rj
ri
(ti, tj)
(a) The area of correctly guessing
AND and OR of two approxima-
tions
xj − tj ≤ rj
xi − ti ≤ ri
a
a
(ti, tj)
X ′0
Xˆ ′0 Xˆ ′0
Xˆ ′0 Xˆ ′0
X ′1
X ′2
X ′4
X ′3
Xˆ ′3
Xˆ ′3
Xˆ ′2
Xˆ ′1
Xˆ ′4
Xˆ ′2
Xˆ ′1
Xˆ ′4
(b) Splitting X ′ and Xˆ ′ into easily compa-
rable blocks
We will now analyze
Prpost[X
′
0]
Prpost[Xˆ′0]
. By property (1), d(x,x′) ≤ a, so -DP gives
fY (y |x′) ≤ ea · fY (y |x). We have
Prpost[X
′
0]
Prpost[Xˆ ′0]
=
∫
X′0
fY (y |x′) · fX(x′) dx′∫
Xˆ′0
fY (y |x) · fX(x) dx
≤ ea ·
∫
X′0
fX(x
′) dx′∫
Xˆ′0
fX(x) dx
= ea · Prpre[X
′
0]
Prpre[Xˆ ′0]
= ea · α0 .
Similarly, for k ∈ [n], ` ∈ L, we have
Prpost[X
`
k]
Prpost[Xˆ`k]
≤ ea · Prpre[X
`
k]
Prpre[Xˆ`k]
= ea · αk .
Let α = maxk∈{0,1,...,n} αk. We get
Prpost[X
′]
Prpost[Xˆ ′]
=
Prpost[X
′
0] +
∑
k∈[n],`∈LPrpost[X
`
k]
Prpost[Xˆ ′0] +
∑
k∈[n],`∈LPrpost[Xˆ
`
k]
≤ e
a · α ·Prpost[Xˆ ′0] +
∑
k∈[n],`∈L e
a · α ·Prpost[Xˆ`k]
Prpost[Xˆ ′0] +
∑
k∈[n],`∈LPrpost[Xˆ
`
k]
= ea · α .
The final result depends on l = argmaxk∈[n]αk.
1. Let l = 0. By property (2), we have
Prpre[X
′
0]
Prpre[Xˆ′0]
= gt(a1,...,an)−gt((a1−1,...,an−1)))gt((a1−1,...,an−1)) .
Applying Equation 1, we get some 0.
2. Let l = k 6= 0. By property (3), we have Prpre[X`k]
Prpre[Xˆ`k]
=
gtk (rk)
gtk (ak)−gtk (rk)
for any
` ∈ L. Applying Equation 1, we get some k.
We take  = mink∈{0,1,...,n}(k). This shows that, in addition to protecting
each dimension separately, we also need to take care of the a1 × · · · × an block
surrounding the actual input t. We emphasize that it holds only for independent
variables, as otherwise we cannot treat different k values independently.
The discussion above can be summarized into Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. Let X = (X1, . . . , Xn), where Xi are pairwise independent, and
Ri = maxxi,x′i∈Xi d(xi, x
′
i). Let (t1, . . . , tn) be the actual data, and let X
′ =
{x ∈ X | ∨ni=1 d(ti, xi) ≤ ri}. Let gi(z) := maxti∈X′i Prpre[xi | d(xi, ti) ≤ z]. LetMq be an -DP mechanism w.r.t. norm ||x1, . . . , xn||∞. To bound the guessing
advantage of X ′ by δ, we need to take  = mink∈{0,1,...,n}(k), where
0 =
− ln
(∏n
i=1 g(ai)−
∏n
i=1 g(ai−1)∏n
i=1 g(ai−1) · (
1
δ+
∏n
i=1 g(ai)−
∏n
i=1 g(ai−1) − 1)
)
a
;
k =
− ln
(
gtk (rk)
gtk (ak)−gtk (rk)
· ( 1δ+gtk (rk) − 1)
)
a
;
where ai is a freely chosen value satisfying ri ≤ ai ≤ Ri, and a = ||a1, . . . , an||∞.
5 Queries with Multiple Outputs
The results of Sec 4.2 and Sec. 4.3 do not depend on the definition of the set of
outputs q(X). They only tell which  is needed to satisfy the desired guessing
advantage, and our task is to come up with a mechanism achieving this . If there
are multiple outputs, we can use the standard notions of parallel and sequential
composition.
Theorem 3 (Sequential composition [14]). Let q(x) = (q1(x) ∈ R, . . . , qm(x) ∈
R). Let DP mechanism be such that, for all i ∈ [m], we have Pr[Mqi(x) ∈ Y ] ≤
ei ·Pr[Mqi(x′) ∈ Y ] for all subsets Y ⊆ R. Then,
Pr[Mq(x) ∈ Y ] ≤ e
∑m
i=1 i ·Pr[Mq(x′) ∈ Y ]
for all subsets Y ⊆ Rm.
Parallel composition of DP says that we can take max(i) instead of sum if
the variables used by different queries are independent. Roughly speaking, the
independence of inputs ensures that the condition d(t, t′) = 1 affects at most one
of the outputs. We can generalize this result using the notion of `p-norms.
Theorem 4. Let q(x1, . . . , xn) = (q1(x1) ∈ R, . . . , qm(xm) ∈ R). Let the dis-
tance d(x, x′) for x, x′ ∈ Rm be defined as an `p-norm. Let a privacy mechanism
Mqi be i-differentially-private. Then, the mechanism Mq = (Mq1 , . . . ,Mqm)
is `q(1, . . . , m)-differentially-private, where `q is the dual norm of `p.
Proof. Let d(x, x′) ≤ 1, and let Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn) ⊆ Rm be arbitrary. We
have x = (x1, . . . , xn) and x
′ = (x′1, . . . , x
′
n). For an `p-norm, denoting di :=
d(xi, x
′
i) for all i ∈ [m], we have d(x, x′) = ||d1, . . . , dm||p. For each i, we have
Pr[Mqi(xi) ∈ Yi] ≤ edii · Pr[Mqi(x′) ∈ Yi]. By Theorem 3, Pr[Mq(x) ∈ Y ] ≤
e
∑m
i=1 dii · Pr[Mq(x′) ∈ Y ], so the mechanism Mq is
∑m
i=1 dii-differentially-
private. By definition of the dual norm, ||1, . . . , m||q = sup{
∑m
i=1 izi | ||z||p ≤ 1}.
Since (d1, . . . , dm) is one candidate for z in this expression, we have
∑m
i=1 dii ≤
||1, . . . , m||q. 
The most intuitive instantiations for Theorem 4 are the cases of `1 and `∞
norms, where d(x, x′) is an integer value, such as the number of rows. These will
give us parallel and sequential compositions. In the case of `1-norm, d(x, x
′) = 1
means that exactly one of the inputs xi will change by 1, so it is sufficient to
take maxi i to protect from one change. In the case of `∞-norm, d(x, x′) = 1
means that each input xi may change by 1, so we need to protect all the outputs
at once, getting
∑
i i.
We can use Theorem 4 to find appropriate partitionings to i, which are
not unique, and the partitioning may be optimized in such a way that the error
would be minimal, i.e. reserve larger i for more sensitive qi. Finding the optimal
partitioning is a possible direction for future research. If the queries are similar
(e.g. groups of a GROUP BY query), then the best option is to assign the same
value to all i.
6 Examples
6.1 Discrete data
Assume that we have a data table cat. Each cat can be male or female, and has
one of the five main colors. We want to count all female tabby cats.
SELECT COUNT(*) FROM cat WHERE gender=‘F’ AND color=‘tabby’;
Define the distance between two databases as 1 iff the gender or the color are
different. Such distance is subsumed standard DP metric, as every tabby female
is viewed as an included record, and every other combination as excluded ,and
sensitivity of a COUNT query w.r.t. this metric is 1, similarly to sensitivity of a
COUNT query w.r.t. standard DP metric. Hence, the query could be executed
with obtained  in PINQ system.
We need to define some prior or the distributions of genders and colors. Let
gender be distributed uniformly, and let colors be distributed as
{red : 0.2, white : 0.1, tabby : 0.25, black : 0.4, tortoise : 0.05} .
AND-event. First, assume that the attacker wins if he guesses both gender and
color. Combining the two sensitive attributes together, we get the probabilities
of AND-events
{(red ∧M) : 0.1, (white ∧M) : 0.05, (tabby ∧M) : 0.125, (black ∧M) : 0.2,
(red ∧ F ) : 0.1, (white ∧ F ) : 0.05, (tabby ∧ F ) : 0.125, (black ∧ F ) : 0.2,
(tortoise ∧M) : 0.025, (tortoise ∧ F ) : 0.025} .
We want to bound guessing advantage by δ = 0.1. As shown in Sec. 4.1, the
worst-case prior would be p = 1−0.12 = 0.45. The closest to the worst case are
(black ∧M) and (black ∧ F ) with p = 0.2. We have p ≤ 1 − p, so it suffices to
take
 ≤
− ln
(
0.2
0.8 · ( 10.1+0.2 − 1)
)
1
= − ln
(
0.2
0.8
· 0.7
0.3
)
≈ 0.539 .
OR-event. Let us now assume that the attacker wins if he guesses either gender
or color. This is equivalent to ‘not guessing both in a wrong way’. We can write
the set of possible correct answers as
{(red ∨M) : 0.6, (white ∧M) : 0.55, (tabby ∧M) : 0.625, (black ∧M) : 0.7,
(red ∧ F ) : 0.6, (white ∧ F ) : 0.55, (tabby ∧ F ) : 0.625, (black ∧ F ) : 0.7,
(tortoise ∧M) : 0.525, (tortoise ∧ F ) : 0.525} .
The closest to the worst prior are (tortoise∧M) and (tortoise∧F ) with p = 0.525.
We have p ≤ 1− p, so it suffices to take
 ≤
− ln
(
0.475
0.525 · ( 10.1+0.475 − 1)
)
1
= − ln
(
0.475
0.425
· 0.425
0.575
)
≈ 0.402 .
As sensitivity of COUNT query w.r.t. proposed metric is 1, using Laplace
mechanism (described e.g. in [3]), it would be sufficient to add Laplace noise with
scaling parameter λ = 1/0.539 ≈ 1.86 for the AND-event, and 1/0.402 ≈ 2.49
for the OR-event.
6.2 Continuous data with univariate approximation
Assume that we have a data table employee. Each of the employees has some
fixed salary, and we want to find the total employer expenses.
SELECT SUM(salary) FROM employee;
Assume that the attacker wins if he guesses someone’s salary with precision of
r = 100 currency units. For prior, let us assume that the salary of each employee
is distributed normally according toN (µ = 2000, σ2 = 55556) (so σ ≈ 235.7), i.e.
Pr[x ∈ (1000, 3000)] ≈ erf (3) ≈ 0.99998. Using definition of CDF for normal dis-
tribution, Pr[|x− t| ≤ r] = erf
(
t+r−µ
σ
√
2
)
−erf
(
t−r−µ
σ
√
2
)
2 =
erf( t−1900333 )−erf( t−2100333 )
2 . Since
there is no particular t available, we consider the worst case.
If we want to bound guessing advantage by δ = 0.1, the worst-case prior
would be p = 1−0.12 = 0.45. The prior closest to this value is achieved for t = µ =
2000 for p ≈ 0.42. Let us now take a = 200. We have q = erf (a/(σ · √2)) ≈ 0.6.
Hence,
 ≤
− ln
(
0.42
0.6−0.42 · ( 10.1+0.42 − 1)
)
200
=
0.767
200
≈ 0.0038 .
While  = 0.0038 seems extremely small, note that such  would ensure a
very strong definition of differential privacy, where neighbour tables are defined
as being a = 200 units apart. Alternatively, we could rescale the entire space e.g.
by a = 200, getting  = 0.767. Such  ensures differential privacy for neighbour
databases defined as differing in 1 unit. Since each currency unit contributes 1
unit to the sum, the sensitivity of the query w.r.t. latter distance is 1. Laplace
noise with scaling 1/ ≈ 1.3 is sufficient to ensure the guessing advantage below
0.1, and the noise level is comparable to example of Sec. 6.1. We see that dividing
 by 200 is fine since we are just working with different magnitudes. Also, such a
SUM query would have larger output than a COUNT query (for a similar number
of rows), so the noise would have less impact than in example of Sec. 6.1.
6.3 Continuous data with multivariate approximation
Assume that we have a data table ship. Each ship has some geographic location
and certain maximum speed. At some moment, the ships start sailing with their
maximum speed towards the port located at the point (0, 0). We want to know
when the first ship arrives at the port. Using the operator <@> for geographical
distance, which is essentially `2-norm, the query looks like
SELECT MIN((POINT(ship.x,ship.y)<@>(0,0))/ship.speed) FROM ship;
Assume that the attacker wins if he guesses some ship’s location with precision
of r = 10 units w.r.t. `2-norm. Let the prior be defined as the distribution of
distances from the point (0, 0), which is N (µ = 0, σ2 = 1250) (so σ ≈ 35.4), i.e.
Pr[(x, y) ∈ (−150, 150)] ≈ erf (3) ≈ 0.99998. Note that the variables x and y do
not need to be independent, as we work with their joint distribution directly.
Let (tx, ty) be the actual location of a ship. Differently from Sec. 6.2, we can
find only a lower bound
Pr[||(x, y)− (tx, ty)||2 ≤ r] ≥ Pr[(||((x, y)− (0, 0)||2 + ||(tx, ty)− (0, 0)||2 ≤ r)]
=
erf
( ||(x,y)||2+r−||(tx,ty)||2−µ
σ
√
2
)
− erf
( ||(x,y)||2−r+||(tx,ty)||2−µ
σ
√
2
)
2
=
erf
( ||(x,y)||2−||(tx,ty)||2+10
50
)
− erf
( ||(x,y)||2+||(tx,ty)||2−10
50
)
2
.
Bounding guessing advantage by δ = 0.1, the worst-case prior would be p =
1−0.1
2 = 0.45. For the lower bound considered above, the prior closest to this
value is achieved for (tx, ty) = (0.0) for p ≈ 0.22. Note that in this case inequality
becomes an equality, so p cannot be larger. Let us now take a = 20. We have
q = erf
(
a/(σ · √2)) ≈ 0.43. Hence,
 ≤
− ln
(
0.22
0.43−0.22 · ( 10.1+0.22 − 1)
)
10
=
1.25
20
≈ 0.063 .
Similarly to Sec. 6.2, such  ensures differential privacy where neighbour
tables are defined as being a = 20 units apart. Scaling the space by by a = 20,
we get  = 1.25. Let us see how much one distance unit contributes to the final
result. If the ship speed is v, then changing its location by 1 will change the
arrival time by 1v . This will not affect the minimum if that ship was not among
the first ones, but in the worst case the query output will also change by 1v
as well. Let v be the minimal speed of a ship, e.g. v = 1, so that the query
sensitivity would be 1 similarly to the previous examples. Laplace noise with
scaling 1/ ≈ 0.8 is sufficient to ensure the guessing advantage below 0.1.
The noise level seems less than in Sec. 6.2. But is it much or few? This
depends on the magnitude of query outputs. While the same noise level could
be small for SUM and COUNT queries on large tables, it could be worse for a
MIN-query where the output itself is a small quantity. To estimate the goodness
of noise, we need the actual data, and instead of absolute error estimate the
relative error as done e.g. in [10].
7 Conclusion
We have shown how to convert guessing advantage to epsilon. We see from some
examples that the proposed method can give us reasonable noise.
While we have shown how to work with -DP, there exist alternative defini-
tions. Relations between (, δ)-DP and the guessing advantage are considered in
App. B. The proposed approach is tightly bound to a particular DP mechanism,
and we do not have generic results for (, δ)-DP. Extending it to some more
general constructions would be an interesting future work.
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A Optimizing the radius of elements that we want to
make indistinguishable from the input
Let us assume that the inputs are distributed uniformly over a subset of n-
dimensional Banach space with some `p-norm. The hypervolume of a ball of
radius r in an n-dimensional space is cp · rn for a constant cp that depends on
the particular used `p-norm, so if the maximum possible radius is R, we have
Pr[X ′] = cp·r
n
cp·Rn =
(
r
R
)n
.
A straightforward solution would be to find a that maximizes  directly.
As  and guessing advantage are correlated, it seems easier to first find a that
maximizes the advantage, and then compute the corresponding . We get
e−a
Prpre[X
′
a]
Prpre[X ′]
= e−a ·
(
a
R
)n − ( rR)n(
r
R
)n
= e−a ·
(
an − rn
rn
)
,
which allows to find the optimal a for the given , that maximizes the quantity.
For n = 1, this can be done using simple calculus, and it gives Prpost[X
′] ≤
1
1+(er+1·r)−1 for a =
1
 + r. Now the problem is that a in turn depends on .
Recall that our goal is to achieve Prpost[X
′] ≤ Prpre[X ′]+δ for some predefined
advantage δ. Assuming uniform distribution on a subset ofX, we get Prpre[X
′] =
r
R . Using the equality Prpost[X
′] ≤ 11+(er+1·r)−1 we can express  as follows:
1
1 + (er+1 · r)−1 ≤
r
R
+ δ
1 + (er+1 · r)−1 ≥ 1r
R + δ
(er+1 · r)−1 ≥ 1r
R + δ
− 1 = 1− (
r
R + δ)
r
R + δ
er · r ≤
r
R + δ
e · (1− ( rR + δ))
.
To get r, we need to find a solution to an equation of the form x · ex = y. The
solution is x = W (y), where W is so-called Lambert function. We get
 ≤W
( r
R + δ
e · (1− ( rR + δ))
)
/r .
There is no closed form for W , but there exist good approximation methods
for computing it. For example, we can use the iterative method of [6]:
w0(y) = 1
wn+1(y) = wn−1(y)− wn−1(y) · e
wn(y) − y
(wn(y) + 1) · ewn(y) .
For n > 1, it is easier to evaluate directly
Prpost[X
′] =
∫
X′ Pr[Mq(x′) ∈ Y ]fX(x′)dx′∫
X
Pr[Mq(x) ∈ Y ]fX(x)dx ≤ e
a
∫
X′
fX(x
′)∫
x:d(x,x′)≤a fX(x)dx
dx′
= ea
∫
X′
fX(x
′)(
a
R
)n dx′ = ea( a
R
)n ( rR)n = ea · ( ra)n . (2)
This gives Prpost[X
′] ≤ ( ·e·rn )n at the point a = n . Alternatively, we can
compute optimal a for each univariate dimension separately, by first computing
 and then turning it into a = 1 + r, and combine as discussed in Sec. 4.2.
A.1 Fixing the Probability that Noise Stays Below a Certain Bound
First of all, we provide a small result that will not only be helpful for estimating
(, δ)-GA, but is also useful by itself. As described in [10], we quantify the noise
magnitude as ξ := c(t)b , where c(t) is the derivative sensitivity at point t (t is
the actual data) and b a parameter that depends on  and β, e.g. b = ( γ − β)
for Cauchy distribution GenCauchy(γ). The additive noise is ξ · η, where η is
sampled from Cauchy distribution. Since the value ξ itself does not give user any
intuition how large that noise is, we interpreted ξ as the probability that error
stays below ξ. Knowing that x ∼
√
2
pi · 11+|x|4 , we computed∫ 1
−1
√
2
pi
· 1
1 + |x|4 dx ≈ 0.78 ,
thus fixing the probability that noise stays below ξ to a constant p = 0.78. We
would like to make our result more flexible and let the user choose p. Denoting
PDF of noise distribution by fη(x), we need to find a such that∫ a
−a
fη(x) dx = p .
For Laplace distribution, the equation
∫ a
−a

2 · e−|x|dx = p reduces to 1− e−a =
p, and the solution is a = − ln(1−p) . Unfortunately, there is no nice solution
for Cauchy noise. However, since
∫ a
−a fη(x) dx = 2 ·
∫ a
0
fη(x) dx, and fη(x) is
monotone in [0,∞), we can use window binary search to find a for non-scaled
Cauchy distribution. Now, in order to get probability p for x = ξη, we just need
to take aξ instead of a, as we have
p =
∫ a
−a
fη(x) dx =
∫ a
−a
fη(ξx) d(ξx) =
∫ aξ
−aξ
1
ξ
· fη(ξx) dx .
B (, δ)-Guessing Advantage
So far, we have shown how to convert  of a DP mechanism to an upper bound
guessing advantage. We would like to extend our results to a (, δ)-DP mecha-
nism. Unfortunately, it turns out that, for δ > 0, the posterior guessing proba-
bility is tightly related to the quantity fY (y|x), and turns out to be unbounded,
i.e. there always exists y ∈ Y for which the DP mechanism gives no guarantees
at all. This happens in the “tails” of noise distribution, so although we cannot
guarantee privacy for an arbitrary output y ∈ Y , we can compute a bound on
guessing advantage ′ that holds with sufficiently high probability δ′, similarly
to (, δ)-DP definition. In overall, we get that the guessing advantage is bounded
by ′ with probability δ′, and it is bounded by 1 with probability 1− δ′. That is,
in average the guessing advantage is bounded by ′ ·δ′+(1−δ′) = 1+(′−1) ·δ′,
giving us a single number, thus allowing to use the original definition of attacker
advantage.
B.1 (, δ)-DP to (, δ)-GA
Suppose that we have an (, δ) DP mechanism. We show how to convert it to
(′, δ′) guessing advantage. Let δ′ be the probability with which we want the
obtained upper bound to hold. We show how to compute an upper bound on
guessing advantage ′ that holds with probability δ′. Alternatively, we can fix ′
and find δ′. In both cases, it may happen that there is no ′ > 0 or δ′ > 0 for
the initial choice of (, δ).
Let t ∈ X be the actual input. Let X ′ := {x | d(x, t) < r} be the set of inputs
for which the attacker’s guess is considered correct. Let Xˆ ′ ⊆ X \ X ′ be such
that ∀x′ ∈ X ′, x ∈ Xˆ ′ : d(x, x′) ≤ a for some a ∈ R+. In practice, we take
Xˆ ′ := {x | r < d(x, t) ≤ a}. Without loss of generality, we may take a = 1 and
scale all distances accordingly. We will find a that gives us least noise.
Let p =
∫
X′ fX(x)dx, and q =
∫
Xˆ′ fX(x)dx. Let us compute the upper bound
on posterior probability based on Bayesian inference, similarly to D.1.7. Assum-
ing that the observation y is obtained using (, δ)-DP mechanism w.r.t. scaled
distance d′(x, x′) := 1ad(x, x
′), we have fY (y|x) ≤ e · fY (y|x′) + δ. An upper
bound on posterior guess is
Prpost[X
′] =
1
1 +
∫
Xˆ′ fY (y|x)fX(x)dx∫
X′ fY (y|x′)fX(x′)dx′
=
1
1 +
∫
Xˆ′
fY (y|x)
fY (y|x)e+δ fX(x)dx∫
X′ fX(x
′)dx′
=
1
1 +
∫
Xˆ′
1
e+ δ
fY (y|x)
fX(x)dx∫
X′ fX(x
′)dx′
≤ 1
1 + 1
e+ δ
inf
x∈Xˆ′ fY (y|x)
· qp
We want to bound this quantity from above by p + ′. The problem is with
χ
y
:= infx∈Xˆ′ fY (y|x). It is possible that χy = 0 for the given y ∈ Y , which gives
a trivial upper bound Prpost[X
′] ≤ 1. We need to introduce the probability δ′
of getting “sufficiently good” y ∈ Y .
If δ′ is fixed, then we just compute a lower bound on χ
y
, which is fη(c(t) +
d(δ′)), where d(δ′) satisfying
∫ d(δ′)
−d(δ′) fη(z)dz = δ
′ can be computed as shown in
Sec. A.1. After evaluating χ
y
, the value of ′ can be found in a straightforward
way as
′ =
1
1 + 1
e+ δ
fη(c(t)+d(δ))
· qp
− p ,
where ′ < 0 means that we could not satisfy (′, δ′)-GA for the given δ′.
If ′ is fixed, then we need
χ
y
≥ δ
p+′
1−(p+′) · qp − e
,
so we find d such that fη(c(t) + d) = χy and compute δ
′ =
∫ d
−d fη(z)dz. If
fη(c(t)) ≤ δp+′
1−(p+′) ·
q
p−e
, then such d does not exist, meaning that we could not
satisfy (′, δ′)-GA for the given ′.
B.2 (, δ)-GA to (, δ)-DP
For our privacy analyses, we need to compute the converse: given an (′, δ′)
requirement on GA, find an appropriate (, δ) for DP and generate the noise
accordingly. The input can be given in terms of average guessing advantage
∆ = 1 + (′− 1) · δ′, which gives freedom in choosing ′ and δ′. We show that, as
far as we can choose  and δ ourselves, for some noise distributions (like Laplace)
we can get δ′ = 0, which simplifies the solution and allows us to continue using
the old definition of GA.
While intuitively (, δ)-DP means that pure -DP is satisfied except some bad
y ∈ Y comes into play, this “bad” event probability is not necessarily δ. There are
different ways to define (, δ)-DP, discussed e.g. in [15]. We give transformations
between DP and GA for the two main definitions.
Definition 6 (Approximate DP [15]). Let Mq : X → Y be a probabilistic
mechanism. We say Mq is (, δ) differentially private if for all sets S ⊆ Y and
x0, x1 ∈ X we have
Pr[Mq(x0) ∈ S] ≤ e·d(x0,x1) ·Pr[Mq(x1) ∈ S] + δ .
Definition 7 (Probabilistic DP [15]). Let Mq : X → Y be a probabilis-
tic mechanism. We say Mq is (, δ)-probabilistically differentially private if
for all x0, x1 ∈ X there are sets Sδ0 , Sδ1 ⊆ Y with Pr[Mq(x0) ∈ Sδ0 ] ≤ δ and
Pr[Mq(x1) ∈ Sδ1 ] ≤ δ s.t. for all sets S ⊆ Y the following holds:
– Pr[Mq(x0) ∈ S \ Sδ0 ] ≤ e·d(x0,x1) ·Pr[Mq(x1) ∈ S \ Sδ0 ] ;
– Pr[Mq(x1) ∈ S \ Sδ1 ] ≤ e·d(x0,x1) ·Pr[Mq(x0) ∈ S \ Sδ1 ] .
Achieving (, δ)-GA for Probabilistic DP. It is easier to achieve (, δ)-GA for
Definition 7. Let y ∈ Y be such that Pr[y|x] ≤ Pr[y|x′]e for all x, x′. By
Definition 7, this happens for at least (1− δ) of values y ∈ Y , so we now use the
same δ in GA and DP definitions. For those y, we compute  in the same way as
we did it for -DP. The desired guessing advantage is achieved with probability
1− δ.
Achieving (, δ)-GA for Approximate DP. For Definition 6, we do not have a
direct conversion to probability of failure, and we need to compute it ourselves,
by estimating the noise distribution. Let y ∈ Y be arbitrary. Applying definition
of (, δ)-DP, we get χ
y
= infx∈Xˆ′ fY (y|x) ≥ (supx∈Xˆ′ fY (y|x) − δ) · e−, where
supx∈Xˆ′ fY (y|x) =: χy is a strictly positive quantity.
Prpost[X
′] ≤ 1
1 + 1
e+ δ
inf
x∈Xˆ′ fY (y|x)
· qp
≤ 1
1 + 1
e+ δ
e−(sup
x∈Xˆ′ fY (y|x)−δ)
· qp
=
1
1 + 1
e+ δ
e−(χy−δ)
· qp
=
1
1 + e− · 1
1+ δχy−δ
· qp
=
1
1 + e−(1− δχy ) ·
q
p
.
If δ ≥ χy, then we cannot come up with  > 0, so we need δ to be small
enough. The problem here is that  and δ are correlated in a certain way. If we
fixed δ = 0, then we could find  in the same way as we did it in D1.7, but it
may happen that (, δ)-DP can be achieved only if infinite noise is used. The
problem is that  in turn depends on δ, and to optimize them simultaneously,
we need to know more about their correlation. Also, the quantity χy depends on
both  and δ, and we need to know the noise distribution to find a non-trivial
lower bound on χy.
Using results of [10], for Laplace noise based on β-smooth derivative sensi-
tivity, we need to take δ = 2e−1−
−b
β , where b + β ≤ . For a fixed b, we get
χy =
b
2·cβ(t) , where cβ(t) is β-smooth derivative sensitivity of the query. We get
1
1 + e−(1− 4e
−1− −b
β ·cβ(t)
b ) · qp
.
To get a reasonable , we need (1− 4e
−1− −b
β ·cβ(t)
b ) > 0. If we take β ≤ −b−1−ln( b4 )
(note that β > 0 as b < ), then we get
4e−1−
−b
β · cβ(t)
b
≤ 4e
ln( b4 ) · cβ(t)
b
= cβ(t) .
If cβ(t) < 1, then we are done. In general, we can proceed and decrease β
as much as we like. If cβ(t) ≤ C for some constant C ≤ ∞. we need to take
β ≤ −b
−1−ln( b4C )
. If there is no global upper bound on derivative sensitivity, we
can see it as C = ∞, which gives β = 0 and results in infinite noise. In the
latter case, there is still possibility that we can get finite noise, and a possible
approach is to try out different values of C ′ using window binary search and
checking whether obtained β satisfies cβ(t) ≤ C ′. This can be useful also if
C <∞, just to check if a better solution exists.
Since there are several parameters to optimize, we now describe a particular
procedure of finding appropriate parameters.
– Let  be the parameter we would get from -DP (i.e. for δ = 0).
– Let β and b be the optimal values for Cauchy noise, found using search over
β as described in [10]. Note that these will not necessary be optimal for
Laplace noise, but they give a fair starting point.
– Assume that e− in GA formula is multiplied by some e−α ≤ 1. This means
that, if  would be the parameter we got for -DP, we would need ′ = −α
for (′, δ)-DP. This sets a constraint α ≤ . Now α ∈ [0, ] is a parameter
that can be optimized.
– We need to find b′ such that 1 − 4e
−α−1− −α−b
′
β ·cβ(t)
b′ ≥ e−α. For this, we
need to satisfy the equation e
b′/β
b′/β ≤ (1−e
−α)β
4cβ(t)·e−α−1−(−α)/β . The solution that
satisfies the equality is b′ = −β ·W (− 4cβ(t)·e−α−1−(−α)/β(1−e−α)β ), where W is Lam-
bert’s W function. By definition, W (y) = x such that x · ex = y, and since
ex
x =
−1
e−x(−x) , the equation e
x/x = y can be solved as x = −W (− 1y ). If
β = 0, we will have division by 0, but in this case we can compute directly
δ = 0, which gives us α = 0 and b′ = − β.
While using Lambert’s W gives a correct solution, it does not necessarily give
us the best noise. We need to satisfy the inequality 1− 4e
−α−1− −α−b
′
β ·cβ(t)
b′ ≥
e−α, and we may get better results for values of b that make this inequality
non-strict. Hence, it makes sense to optimize the parameter b′ by searching
through b′ ∈ [0, . . . , − α− β].
– So far, α is a free parameter that can be optimized. We do it by searching
through α ∈ [0, ].
– The noise level
cβ(t)
b′ that we get in this way gives us the desired bound on
guessing advantage.
